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Abstract  
We develop a simple model that motivates fiscal stabilisation policy, in the presence of economic 
and control uncertainty. An examination of a real-time database of economic variables and forecasts 
shows that our knowledge of the current and future state of the economy is subject to significant 
revisions over time. Multi-year government spending plans are also significantly revised over 
successive fiscal events. We show the risk for any given government expenditure plan by 
constructing measures of historical expenditure revisions. We also show that the most significant 
factor in explaining public expenditure revisions are changes to the expected path of GDP growth. 
We illustrate how to model the components of public expenditure and are thus able to remark on 
the extent to which expenditure is warranted. Finally we report on findings from interviews with key 
policymakers in the past 25 years on how fiscal expenditure was managed and uncertainty 
confronted. 
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Key Findings
• We illustrate the extent to which our knowledge of the state of the economy is
revised in its measurement (Figure 1) but also in forecasts (Figure 2) that are
based on economic data.
• Government expenditure plans are themselves subject to considerable uncertainty
at every fiscal event (Figure 3) and we should, as a matter of course, be constructing
error bands around the Chancellor’s projections
• The most significant factor in explaining changes to published expenditure plans
are revising to GDP growth forecast (Figure 8) and find that a 1% revision to GDP
expectations leads to a 0.9% fall in government expenditure (Table 1). For longer
horizons the response can be up to twice as large, which suggests that automatic
stabilisers are in place.
• We find that Bank rate is positively associated with spending revisions suggesting
that the MPC may be responding to the aggregate demand boost from high
expenditures (Table 1).
• We separate the Cameron and May Governments from the rest of the sample and
find on a preliminary basis that since 2010 (Table 2), spending plans have been
somewhat less counter-cyclical than previously, or equivalently, the Major, Blair
and Brown governments reacted more to news of the economy in terms of adjusting
the path of TME.
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Executive Summary
Focus of the paper
Policy decisions on public expenditure and tax are taken against a backdrop of
considerable error in measuring the state of the economy and in producing economic
forecasts. In every year from 2007 to 2017, the GDP forecast for the year of the budget
by HM Treasury until 2010 and then by the OBR over-predicted the outturn for economic
growth. There are substantial lags from the preliminary measures of activity to the final
estimate and accordingly significant revisions to our understanding of the state of the
economy are stored up. For example, ONS data on GDP were revised 73 times upwards
and 33 times downwards after the first month following publication in the period 1989-
2016 with a median absolute revision of 0.2% points to the published annual growth
rate.
This paper seeks to understand the scale of those revisions with the context in
the recent history of UK fiscal policy (1993-2015), with a particular emphasis on the
expenditure side and the relationship to planning and control during that period, and
how it might be possible to use statistical techniques and ‘rules of thumb’ to deal with
the uncertainty arising from imperfect knowledge about the true state of the economy.
This raises a number of questions, which our paper addresses:
1. Were these revisions to GDP statistically large and significant?
2. What impact, if any, did they have on public spending plans?
3. What explains, if any, the revisions to government expenditure plans in relation
to total managed expenditure and its composition?
4. How effective were the ‘rules of thumb’ used by HMT to anticipate changes to
economic forecasts and knowledge of the state of the economy?
5. Can we model the overall level of government expenditure to understand what is
warranted and what is not in aggregate and by function?
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 illustrates some key interactions between
fiscal policy and the state of the economy and we explore the extent to which government
expenditure might offset deviations in output from potential, Section 3 outlines the
extent of revisions to the preliminary estimates of GDP and show that these can explain
a significant portion of GDP forecast errors, which implies that GDP revisions are a key
component to learning about the evolving state of the economy. Given the evolution
in the state of the economy, we then measure the revisions to expenditure plans. We
will also examine the planned expenditure over time and its composition and evaluate
the extent to which they changed as a result of changes in the state of the economy or
from policy choice. Accordingly, Section 4 outlines our core dataset and explains our
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econometric methodology for understanding the drivers of expenditure revisions. One
key focus aspect of this work will be the distinction between the normal course of action
and responses to unanticipated shocks (for which revisions to expenditure plans and
automatic stabilisers might be a proxy). In Section 5 we start to construct measures
of what we call ‘warranted expenditure’ for overall expenditure and for spending by
departments. The residuals from these measures might be used to guide or explain
future expenditure plans. Section 6 outlines some provisional findings of interviews we
have had with policymakers based on our preliminary analysis presented in Sections 2
to 5. The final section concludes and offers pointers to future work.
Core Argument and findings
Government control of fiscal expenditure can refer to a number of different measures
of overall public expenditure (see Thain and Wright, 1995). The most widely used
is Total Managed Expenditure (TME) and this refers to the total amount that the
government spends in a fiscal year. Within the National Accounts system it is defined
as the sum of public sector current expenditure and public sector gross investment. TME
can be broken down into two subcomponents:
1. Departmental Expenditure Limits (DEL) set the amount that government
departments are allocated to spend in a given fiscal year and usually result from
negotiations with HMT before a spending review. Departments cannot exceed the
DEL but DELs can be altered between spending reviews, as a result of policy
changes or by drawing money from the Treasury reserve. Examples include the
costs of running services, hospitals, schools, and staffing costs; and
2. Annually Managed Expenditure (AME) encompasses all spending that is not
controlled by a government department. It is classed as spending that cannot
reasonably be subject to firm multi-year limits. AME includes welfare, pensions,
debt interest payments, accounting adjustments etc.; in other words, AME
generally includes demand-led spending programmes.
Both AMEs and DELs can be further split into resource and capital components.
Resource spending can be thought of as money that is spent on day-to-day resource
and administration costs, while capital spending is on investment and projects that are
designed to promote economic growth.
While the existing literature discusses the path of UK fiscal policy for the period
in question (e.g. Johnson, 2016), this paper, motivated by the literature on policy
uncertainty, explores several areas of particular importance (see, for example, Auerbach,
2014). First, we are motivated by the observation that there is uncertainty in statistical
measures of economic activity and these uncertainties are a major factor in explaining
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revisions to economic forecasts. Secondly, and accordingly, when HMT presents a path
for government expenditure, what risks are there to that path and to what extent can
we model the factors that lead to systematic revisions to published expenditure plans?
Thirdly, the period from the early 1990s has been characterised by the adoption of
formal rules that replaced earlier, more ad hoc arrangements (see, for example, Chadha
and Nolan, 2007), adopted a formal inflation target for monetary policy in 1992 and
developed an independent fiscal council to assess HMT expenditure and revenue plans in
2010. We also ask how much sense does it make to impose spending limits on individual
government departments or overall total managed expenditures. Finally, we start to
model actual expenditure as a conditional rule (see Pain et al, 1997).
We present new results on the size of data revisions and the extent to which they
affect forecasts of economic activity. Our analysis of the revisions to economic data in
the period 1993-2015 shows that there has only been one occasion when GDP figures
were not revised a quarter after the first release, and only 14 times when there was
no change after a month. There were 73 upward revisions and 33 downward revisions
after the first month following release. The average upward revision was 0.23% and the
average downward revision was 0.33% and they are both statistically significant.
We then go on to present new estimates of the uncertainty of fiscal expenditure plans,
based on the revisions to plans announced at fiscal events since 1990. Our research shows
the scale of uncertainty around current spending projections based on the size of historic
past forecast errors at each horizon. For instance, the standard deviation of errors made
in the past by the fiscal authority in year-ahead projections of total managed expenditure
is around £5 billion. This implies that with a certainty of 95% the spending next year
(as at the 2017 Budget) falls within a range of £824-£844 billion, or within twice £5
billion in either direction from the central projection of £834 billion.
Given these uncertainties in expenditure we outline the fiscal problem of stabilising
output in the presence of a monetary policy maker targeting inflation and with
uncertainty in control parameters, in the sense of Brainard (1967). We show that multi-
year government spending plans are also significantly revised over successive fiscal events,
and particularly after changes in government. In our period, Conservative governments
tended to revise spending up more significantly than Labour governments. A candidate
explanation for this occurs through early Coalition government spending plans (2010-
15) significantly ‘over-promising’ in terms of spending reduction plans, which were then
subsequently revised up due to a combination of the economy underperforming and
(possibly) political pressures. It would seem that since 2010, spending plans have been
less counter-cyclical than previously. Or equivalently, the Major, Blair and Brown
governments reacted more to news of the economy in terms of adjusting the path of
TME.
We show the risk for any given government expenditure plan by constructing
measures of historical expenditure revisions. We also show that the most significant
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factor in explaining public expenditure revisions are changes to the expected path of
GDP growth. We illustrate how to model the components of public expenditure and are
thus able to remark on the extent to which expenditure is warranted, which we define as
an estimate of the amount of public spending that would have been chosen by previous
governments if confronted by the circumstances of today. Based on Hantzsche and Young
(2018), we find that the consolidation in public spending between 2010-11 and 2014-15
was actually a little slower than what was warranted. The weak fiscal position at the
start of the period (2010) required a reduction of TME to close to 40 per cent of GDP
over a five-year period. This is broadly the pace of consolidation that the coalition
government wanted to achieve when it set out its 2010 spending plans. However, our
analysis shows that after 2014-15, actual spending became more stringent than would
have been warranted by previous governments’ spending priorities. In particular rising
demographic pressures in combination with a more favourable business cycle meant that
our benchmark path for TME rises back up to 44 per cent of GDP, compared to actual
spending which dropped below 40 per cent in 2016-17.
Finally we report on findings from interviews with key policymakers in the past 25
years on how fiscal expenditure was managed and uncertainty confronted. The first
finding relates to the nature and kind of uncertainty that policy- and decision-makers
have to manage. A number of interviewees argued that there is an important difference
between two levels of uncertainty: (1) ‘predictable’ uncertainty, which includes ‘normal-
order’ events (political or economic events such as changes in government or interest
rate changes), what we might think of as identifiable risks; and (2) ‘unpredictable’
uncertainty, which relates to unidentifiable risks, for example the implications of events
such as the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management in 1998, the bursting of the
dot.com bubble in 2001, the 2008 financial crash (Chadha et al., 2016) or the near-
collapse of the Eurozone in 2010-11. The second finding concerns fiscal rules. All the
interviewees emphasised that fiscal rules matter but that they have a limited duration.
One of the main reasons why fiscal rules and their usefulness are limited in time is the
trade-off between credibility and flexibility. At some point in the economic and the
political cycle, sticking to a set of rules will be at odds with having room for manoeuvre.
Third, fiscal rules tend to reduce uncertainty in the sense of unpredictable behaviour
by government, but they can introduce new types of complexity that exacerbate an
already uncertain horizon. For example, new rules can lead to even greater departmental
under-spend than previous fiscal frameworks, as the sanctions for over-spend may
become more severe. Fourth and in light of the above, what ‘rules of thumb’ did HMT
use in order to manage uncertainty? ‘Rules of thumb’ ranged from formal fiscal rules
via estimates of Annual Managed Expenditure and forecasts for GDP and tax revenue
to pension expenditure, public sector pay and other big ‘fixed costs’ (e.g. monthly
meetings of pay boards in the period 1997-2010). Arguably, this process can be described
as the ‘rule of big numbers’, which is the result of an asymmetry of information in
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favour of spending departments. Finally, our research found that the commitment to
prudence, which successive governments have invoked, raises questions about the purpose
of prudence (economic and/or political considerations) and the ways in which prudent
planning of public expenditure translates into economic policy. HMT tends to have built-
in margins of errors: (i) cutting capital expenditure rather than current spending; (ii)
‘back pockets’ to offset forecast errors. Problems arise when cutting capital expenditure
hits national output in times of sluggish economic growth or when new spending pledges
drain ‘back pockets’.
Concluding reflections and future work
The analysis in this paper has focussed solely on the expenditure side of fiscal
planning undertaken by the Treasury. Our intentions for future work are to extend
this analysis in a number of directions, incorporating suggestions from participants
at our policy workshop held at NIESR. In particular, and as discussed earlier, the
potential heterogeneity across types of spending in response to news is of particular
interest. While our spending series is an aggregate measure, it is important to recall
the spending structure introduced in 1997 that splits spending into DEL and AME.
Repeating the analysis for disaggregated spending will shed light on whether our finding
of a countercyclical response of spending reflects heterogeneous responses of DEL and
AME. The same distinction can be made in terms of Government consumption and
capital spending, allowing us to examine whether politicians and Treasury officials
routinely prioritise one area of spending when they receive new information about the
economy. This work will involve extending the cross-sectional dimension of our sample
by disaggregating the headline series into the sub-components discussed here.
Several workshop participants emphasised that to understand fully the pass-through
mechanism from revisions to growth forecasts to changes to spending plans, it is
important to consider both the reaction of tax receipt forecasts to changes in growth
forecasts, as well as how the level of fiscal space available to the Government affects
both reductions to spending (if, for example, debt/GDP is high by historical standards)
and increases in spending (if the Government has a high degree of ‘fiscal space’). In a
sense, these questions are linked, in that they involve understanding how revisions to
the state of the economy, spending and taxation affect each other contemporaneously.
Offering a definitive answer will involve extending our available dataset both in terms
of the number of periods available, as well as creating a similar revision series for tax
receipts and solving the endogeneity problem that is immediately apparent. As such,
this work is deliberately left as work for a larger scale project.
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Understanding and Confronting Uncertainty:
Revisions to UK Government Expenditure Plans
1 Introduction
Policy decisions on expenditure and tax are taken against a backdrop of considerable
error in measuring the state of the economy and in producing economic forecasts. In
every year from 2007 to 2017, the GDP forecast for the year of the budget by HM
Treasury until 2010 and then by the OBR over-predicted the outturn for economic
growth. There are substantial lags from the preliminary measures of activity to the final
estimate and accordingly significant revisions to our understanding of the state of the
economy are stored up, as a consequence. This paper seeks to understand the scale of
those revisions with the context in the recent history of UK fiscal policy (1993-2015),
with a particular emphasis on the expenditure side and the relationship to planning and
control during that period, and how it might be possible to use statistical techniques and
‘rules of thumb’ to deal with the uncertainty arising from imperfect knowledge about
the true state of the economy.
For example, ONS data on GDP were revised 73 times upwards and 33 times
downwards after the first month following publication in the period 1989-2016 with
a median absolute revision of 0.2% points. This raises a number of questions, which our
paper addresses:
1. Were these revisions statistically large and significant?
2. What impact, if any, did they have on public spending plans?
3. What explains, if any, the revisions to government expenditure plans in relation
to total managed expenditure and its composition?
4. How effective were the ‘rules of thumb’ used by HMT to anticipate changes to
economic forecasts and knowledge of the state of the economy?
5. Can we model the overall level of government expenditure to understand what is
warranted and what is not in aggregate and by function?
While the existing literature discusses the path of UK fiscal policy for the period
in question (e.g. Johnson, 2016), this paper, motivated by the literature on policy
uncertainty, explores several areas of particular importance (see, for example, Auerbach,
2014). First, we are motivated by the observation that there is uncertainty in statistical
measures of economic activity and these uncertainties are a major factor in explaining
revisions to economic forecasts. Secondly, and accordingly, when HMT presents a path
for government expenditure, what risks are there to that path and to what extent can
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we model the factors that lead to systematic revisions to published expenditure plans?
Thirdly, the period from the early 1990s has been characterised by the adoption of
formal rules that replaced earlier, more ad hoc arrangements (see, for example, Chadha
and Nolan, 2007), adopted a formal inflation target for monetary policy in 1992 and
developed an independent fiscal council to assess HMT expenditure and revenue plans in
2010. We also ask how much sense does it make to impose spending limits on individual
government departments or overall total managed expenditures. Finally, we start to
model actual expenditure as a conditional rule (see Pain et al, 1997). We present new
results on the extent of data revisions and the extent to which they affect forecasts
of economic activity. We then go on to present new estimates of the uncertainty of
fiscal expenditure plans, based on the revisions to plans announced at fiscal events
since 1990. Given these uncertainties in expenditure we outline the fiscal problem of
stabilising output in the presence of a monetary policy maker targeting inflation and
with uncertainty in control parameters, in the sense of Brainard (1967). We show
that multi-year government spending plans are also significantly revised over successive
fiscal events, and particularly after changes in government. We show the risk for any
given government expenditure plan by constructing measures of historical expenditure
revisions. We also show that the most significant factor in explaining public expenditure
revisions are changes to the expected path of GDP growth. We illustrate how to model
the components of public expenditure and are thus able to remark on the extent to which
expenditure is warranted. Throughout the paper we report on findings from interviews
with key policymakers in the past 25 years on how fiscal expenditure was managed
and uncertainty confronted. (See Annex for a detailed summary of the interviews,
which have been anonymised). Specifically, the interviews were semi-structured and
they involved one former Chancellor of the Exchequer, one former Chief Secretary to
the Treasury, one former chief adviser to the Chancellor and three former officials in
HMT. The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 illustrates some key interactions
between monetary and fiscal policy and we explore the extent to which government
expenditure might offset deviations in output from potential, Section 3 outlines the
extent of revisions to the preliminary estimates of GDP and show that these can explain
a significant portion of GDP forecast errors, which implies that GDP revisions are a key
component to learning about the evolving state of the economy. Given the evolution
in the state of the economy, we then measure the revisions to expenditure plans. We
will also examine the planned expenditure over time and its composition and evaluate
the extent to which they changed as a result of changes in the state of the economy or
from policy choice. Accordingly, Section 4 outlines our core dataset and explains our
econometric methodology for understanding the drivers of expenditure revisions. One
key focus aspect of this work will be the distinction between the normal course of action
(including the operation of ‘automatic stabilisers’) and responses to unanticipated shocks
(for which revisions to expenditure plans might be a proxy). In Section 5 we start to
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construct measures of what we call ‘warranted expenditure’ for overall expenditure and
for spending by departments. The residuals from these measures might be used to guide
or explain future expenditure plans. The final section concludes and offers pointers to
future work.
2 Fiscal Response
To illustrate the issues facing monetary and fiscal policymakers, we develop a simple
model of the policy setting ‘game’ faced by the authorities. In this set-up, similar in
spirit to the analysis presented in Balls and O’Donnell (2002), output is subject to supply
and demand shocks with the fiscal and monetary authorities tasked with stabilising
output. The fiscal authority sets the monetary policy target, which we assume is the
long run average of inflation, and this target is pursued with the policy rate. Fiscal
policy is then tasked with reducing the overall variance of output around its potential
by choosing the level of public expenditures. The particular problem that the fiscal policy
authority faces is that it would not wish to conflict with the monetary policy authority
by stimulating (contracting) activity simultaneously in an uncoordinated fashion nor
can it know exactly what the impact is on activity of a given changes in its expenditure
path. We do not distinguish between types of government expenditure here but simply
set up the fiscal policy response to demand and supply shocks and motivate our basic
estimating equation in Section 4.
Let us start with a simple exposition of the fiscal authority’s control problem, similar
to Lambertini and Rovelli (2002). Output, Yt, is assumed to deviate from its long run
potential, Y ∗, in response to government expenditure, gt, to deviations in the policy
rate, it, from its natural level, i
∗, that is given by r¯+ ⇡∗ - the long run real rate and
the long run average inflation rate, respectively - and to temporary demand shocks, ✏t,1
(which we assume are not intertemporally correlated) where ↵ and γ are parameters
reflecting the fiscal and interest rate multipliers, respectively.
Yt = Y
∗ + ↵gt − γ(it − ⇡
∗ − r¯) + ✏t,1 (1)
Equation (2) can be thought of as a traditional Phillips curve. Inflation ⇡t differs
from the long run rate with the existence of an output gap, weighted by the parameter
β, in addition to a supply shock, ✏t,2, which we assume has no serial dependence and is
uncorrelated with the demand shock ✏t,1 (we can relax this assumption relatively trivially
but impose it to ease exposition).
⇡t = ⇡
∗ + β(Yt − Y
∗) + ✏t,2 (2)
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The monetary policy authority is set an objective to pursue an inflation target, while
also placing a weight on deviations of the real interest rate from its long run equilibrium
level - noting that i∗ − ⇡t = r¯ , weighted by the parameter µ.
LM = (⇡ − ⇡
∗)2 + µ(it − ⇡
∗ − r¯)2 (3)
By substituting (1) and (2) into (3), and minimising the resulting loss function, we
can solve for the monetary policy makers optimal interest rate response as a function
of aggregate demand and supply shocks, ✏t,1 and ✏t,2, as well as changes in the path of
government expenditure.
ibrt = ⇡
∗ + r¯ +
γβ
γ2β2 + µ
[β(↵gt + ✏t,1) + ✏t,2] (4)
We can then re-write the aggregrate demand equation (1), using (4) to obtain
an expression for deviations of output from potential output that is conditioned on
the monetary policy response (as we have substituted out it), and dependent upon












To simplify the analysis, we rewrite the coefficients premultiplying government










. We can then express the equation for the output gap in
the same fashion as Brainard (1967).
(Yt − Y
∗) = φ1gt + φ2✏t,1 − φ3✏t,2. (6)
Following Brainard, we suggest that the fiscal authority is interested in stabilising
the variance of output around potential output. This can be expressed by taking the
second moment of (6), recalling that we assumed no covariance between the demand and
supply shocks, formally that σ✏1,✏2 = 0, the time subscript is supressed for notational
convenience. We therefore allow for the existence of multiplicative uncertainty in the
three parameters, capturing the notion that the fiscal policy maker is uncertain as to the
exact size of the fiscal multiplier, as they are uncertain as to the impact of the demand









✏22 + 2gt✏1σφ1φ2 − 2g✏2σφ1φ3 + (
¯φ1g − Y
∗)2 (7)
Following Brainard, we take the first order conditions of (7), and rearranging for g to
express the optimal setting of the level of government expenditure as a function of the
level of potential output, the supply and demand shocks, and the covariance between
fiscal expenditure and the shocks themselves.
g =








Equation (8) highlights the ”conservatism” principle, that when the instruments of
policy are uncertain in their impact, the fiscal policymakers sets g at a level lower than




+φ1 > 0. This
effect can, however, be overturned if the sum of the covariances between the demand
and supply shocks and expenditure is sufficiently negative (as the sum enters equation
(8) negatively) to outweigh the uncertainty as to the fiscal multiplier.
The form of the equation we therefore examine in Section 3.4 is given below, which
states that government expenditure is driven by deviations in output from its potential
and shocks ro aggregate demand or supply:
g = Λ1Y
∗ − Λ2✏1 + Λ3✏2 (9)
3 Public Expenditure and the State of the Economy
3.1 Preliminary Analysis
Let us first assess the revisions to economic data in the period 1993-2015. This revision
process often means that early, or preliminary, GDP estimates are far from the final
estimate: Figure 1 shows the difference in real GDP estimates a month and a quarter
after the first release. There has only been one occasion when GDP figures were not
revised a quarter after the first release, and only 14 times when there was no change
after a month. There were 73 upward revisions and 33 downward revisions after the
first month following release, suggesting a possible downward bias in estimation in this
period. The average upward revision was 0.23% and the average downward revision was
0.33% and they are both statistically different from zero. These revisions to measured
data are important in explaining revisions to forecasts of future GDP. And in fact,
the revisions to the year-ahead median consensus forecasts, collected and published by
HMT, tend to explain half of the overall forecast error made. The other half can thus
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be explained by new information since the forecasts were published. In Figure 2, the
horizontal axis shows the consensus revision to GDP growth for year t made between
July and December of year t-1. On the vertical axis the difference between the initial
consensus forecast published in July of year t-1 and the realisation of growth in year t is
shown. Revising forecasts is the standard way to help the reduction in forecast errors.
And fits clearly with the finding of Banbura et al (2011) that interpretation of new public
information plays an increasingly important role in understanding the current state of
the economy.
Given that the preliminary estimates of GDP (and demand components) are subject
to large and statistically significant revisions, and so are noisy, we may wish then to
understand whether these revisions have led to adjustments in public expenditure plans.
First, figure 3 constructs the error bands around the total managed expenditure path
published in the November 2017 budget. The chart illustrates the uncertainty around
current spending projections based on the size of historic past forecast errors at each
horizon. The 95% confidence interval is calculated by adding to both sides of the
published projection two times the standard deviation of nominal TME forecast errors
at each forecast horizon. For instance, the standard deviation of errors made in the
past by the OBR in year-ahead TME projections is around £5bn, which implies that
with a certainty of 95% the spending next year falls within a range of £824-£844 bn, or
within 2x £5bn in either direction from the central projection of £834 bn. We repeat
the exercise for the subsequent four years as well.
Our focus is on how planned expenditure changes over time in light of revised GDP
estimates and other factors, including policy choices as a result of changing political
priorities and institutions (see, for example, Persson et al, 2000). It may also be the
case that GDP estimates have become more unreliable over the business cycle since the
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start of the long expansion in 1992 (Chadha et al. 2016), as changes in the structure
of the economy may have made the estimation of GDP more problematic. There has
also been a large and persistent debate about the impact of public expenditure on
activity (see McMahon, 2017) and we may need to understand the scope for ‘flexibility’
in light of changes to knowledge about the state of the economy. To that extent
the debate on flexible inflation targeting has not had an analogue in the fiscal policy
space (see Orphanides, 1998). A number of interviewees argued that there is an
important difference between two levels of uncertainty: (1) ‘predictable’ uncertainty,
which includes ‘normal-order’ events (political or economic events such as changes in
government or interest rate changes), what we might think of as identifiable risks; and
(2) ‘unpredictable’ uncertainty, which relates to unidentifiable risks, for example the
implications of events such as the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management in 1998,
the bursting of the dot.com bubble in 2001, the 2008 financial crash (Chadha et al.,
2016) or the near-collapse of the Eurozone in 2010-11.
Government control of fiscal expenditure can refer to a number of different measures
of overall public expenditure (see Thain and Wright, 1995). The most widely used
is Total Managed Expenditure (TME) and this refers to the total amount that the
government spends in a fiscal year. Within the National Accounts system it is defined
as the sum of public sector current expenditure and public sector gross investment. TME
can be broken down into two subcomponents:
1. Departmental Expenditure Limits (DEL) set the amount that government
departments are allocated to spend in a given fiscal year and usually result from
negotiations with HMT before a spending review. Departments cannot exceed the
DEL but DELs can be altered between spending reviews, as a result of policy
changes or by drawing money from the Treasury reserve. Examples include the
costs of running services, hospitals, schools, and staffing costs; and
2. Annually Managed Expenditure (AME) encompasses all spending that is not
controlled by a government department. It is classed as spending that cannot
reasonably be subject to firm multi-year limits. AME includes welfare, pensions,
debt interest payments, accounting adjustments etc.; in other words, AME
generally includes demand-led spending programmes.
Both AMEs and DELs can be further split into resource and capital components.
Resource spending can be thought of as money that is spent on day-to-day resource
and administration costs, while capital spending is on investment and projects
that are designed to promote economic growth. The distinction between Resource
Annually Managed Expenditure (RAME) and Resource Departmental Expenditure
Limits (RDEL) occurs whether this spending is subject to multi-year planning (as in
DELs) or more volatile spending that is harder to impose multi-year plans on (AME).
8
For this paper we do not split TME into DEL and AME but will wish to examine the
contribution of both elements in any future work.
3.2 Data Analysis
The data used for our analysis is drawn primarily from two sources. We calculate a series
of revisions to Total Managed Expenditure using the real-time database, “Historical
official forecasts”, made available by the Office for Budget Responsibility. The forecasts
for UK real GDP growth in a given fiscal year are drawn from the Institute’s own
forecast database that forms part of its global macroeconometric model, NiGEM. We
exploit NiGEM’s real time database to obtain our previously published forecast for the
same month as any fiscal announcement. Doing so means we can be confident that the
published forecast number incorporates all macroeconomic news that would be available
to the government at the announcement date. Consequently, any revisions to forecasts
of GDP growth reflect new information about the state of the economy between event t
and t− 1 .
Given the Institute’s influence on macroeconomic policy debates in the UK and
the fact that its forecast is included in HMT’s set of independent forecasters further
corroborates our assumption that changes to the economic forecast are observed by
policymakers. To illustrate the TME series graphically, figures 4 and 5 plot each fiscal
plan announced in the House of Commons from 1990 to 2018. Each individual line
corresponds to an announced fiscal plan; plans announced by Conservative majority or
Conservative-led Governments are coloured light blue, while the equivalent series for the
Labour party are in red. The immediate takeaway is that plans do undoubtedly change.
The dashed vertical lines plot election years, which makes clear the change in the fiscal
9
spending plans that occurred with a change in Government.
3.3 Revisions throughout time
The structure of the available data on TME allows us to construct two types of initial
time series of revisions. We call these Fiscal Year revisions and Fiscal Event revisions.
The distinction between the two series occurs in that the fiscal years series captures
revisions for a fixed fiscal year across a range of budgets and pre budget reports, while
the fiscal events series captures revisions for a fixed budget or pre-budget report across







where TMEht is Total Managed Expenditure plan for fiscal year t announced by HMT
at fiscal event h 6 t. The structure of the data and the length of plan announcements
allow us to construct revisions to spending plans at different horizons, denoted as ✏t+i,h,
where t + i denotes a given fiscal year i years in the future. This allows us to compare
how spending plans change at different horizons in response to news about the state of
the economy today.
To illustrate the size of revisions, figure 6 shows the cumulative absolute value of
revisions for a fiscal year. For instance, the fiscal year with the largest revisions (2001-
2002) contains the sum of all revisions where a spending plan was published for that




✏t,h+i = |✏h|+ |✏h+1|+ ...+ |✏N | (11)
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Figure 7 plots the cumulative absolute value of revisions for a given fiscal event.
This includes a range of fiscal revisions. The largest (absolute) value in the series is
that of the June 1998 budget, where the largest individual contribution is the revision
to spending plans in fiscal year 2001-02 (with the revision measured relative to the plan
for 2001-02 published by the Major government). This is expressed as:
NX
t=1
✏t+i,h = |✏t|+ |✏t+1|+ ...+ |✏N | (12)
Before assessing the impact of revisions to growth forecasts on expenditure plans, we
follow Beetsma and Giuliodori (2010) in assessing 1) whether the revision series exhibits
a projection bias (that revisions are not routinely positive or negative) and 2) that there
is no serial correlation in the revision series (that revisions are not predictable from past
11
values of the series). To do so, the revisions are regressed on a constant and their own
lag:
✏t,h = µ0 + µ1✏t,h−1 + vt,h (13)
Testing whether µ0 and µ1 = 0 implements tests 1) and 2). We use Newey-West
errors to account for any possible heteroscedasticity or autocorrelation in the error term
of the above regression. The fiscal events series is unpredictable from previous errors
and also features no projection bias. On the other hand, while the fiscal years series
does not feature any projection bias, lagged revision values do appear to have predictive
power for current revision values
Consequently, in the subsequent analysis we continue using the fiscal events revision
series, and leave the fiscal years series as a descriptive measure.
3.4 Methodology
To analyse how public spending responds to uncertainty about the macroeconomy,
we assess whether adjustments to spending plans can be explained by changes in the
economic outlook. The relationship between spending and the state of the economy
can be thought of as a fiscal reaction function (e.g. Gal´ı and Perotti 2003). When
estimated in real time, results from fiscal reaction functions of advanced economies tend
to show that spending plans are counter-cyclical, whereas outturn data suggests a more
pro-cyclical fiscal policy stance (Cimadomo 2016 reviews the literature). The literature
also suggests that fiscal policy reacts to a number of other factors, like elections. We





= ↵ + β(ght − g
h−1
t ) + γC
h + ✏ht (14)
where TMEht is the total managed expenditure plan for fiscal year t announced by
HMT at fiscal event h 6 t
ght is the NiGEM forecast of UK real GDP growth in fiscal year t published
immediately prior to fiscal event h. Ch is a vector of control variables available in
real time that may affect changes to spending plans or priorities, e.g. claimant count,
Bank Rate, political party in power, election year dummy. The error term is denoted
by ✏ht . As is immediately apparent, in this specification the use of OLS is likely to
be problematic and yield biased coefficient estimates. Growth forecasts for the coming
year may anticipate changes to Government spending plans, if so, ✏ht is likely to be
correlated with the dependent variable. To deal with this, we instrument the regressor
of interest (ght − g
h−1
t ) with variables that directly affect UK GDP (and through GDP
Government spending) but are exogenous with respect to spending plans published by
the UK Government. We use revisions to US GDP growth forecasts over h and h − 1
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(drawn from NiGEM) and changes in the Fed Funds rate between h and h − 1 as
instruments for changes to UK growth forecasts.
Table 1 reports our baseline results. OLS estimates yield biased and insignificant
results, but when we implement our instrumental variable approach, we show that
revisions to UK GDP growth have a negative and statistically significant effect on
TME revisions across a range of forecast horizons and are robust to a range of control
variables. The magnitude varies over the horizon but is consistently negative in the IV
specifications. For revisions that concern the current fiscal year (h = t), a 100 basis
point revision to growth forecasts results in a 85 basis point reduction in TME, while
for t = h + 1 the reduction in TME is between 130 and 170 basis points, depending
on the specification used. Results for t = h + 2 are larger in magnitude but are no
longer statistically significant. This result suggests that revisions to spending plans are
countercyclical in response changes in expectations about the state of the macroeconomy.
One potential explanation for this result (which will be explored in future work) is that
AME expenditure revisions dominate DEL expenditure revisions. This would occur
through the automatic stabiliser effect, whereby when the economy surprises to the
upside, expenditure on out of work welfare payments is lower than forecast, while the
corollary holds for surprises to the downside.
Of the control variables, Bank rate enters with a positive coefficient and remains
significant throughout. Initial inspection implies that tighter monetary policy is
correlated with upward revisions in TME. In fiscal-monetary interaction terms we
may think of this as the Bank of England responding to what it perceives as “loose”
fiscal policy from the Treasury, or vice versa. Of the remaining variables, a higher
claimant is correlated with lower spending, possibly because the variable reflects
institutional changes to spending control over time, while in our sample, Conservative
governments tend to revise spending up more significantly than Labour governments.
A candidate explanation for this occurs through early coalition government spending
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plans significantly “over-promising” in terms of spending reduction plans, which were
then subsequently revised up due to a combination of the economy underperforming and
political pressures.
The conclusion of a countercyclical reaction of expenditure to news about GDP
forecast also holds across different forecast horizons. While the results in table 1 focus
on revisions to GDP forecasts and TME spending for the same year, figure 8 reports
the impact of a revision to a GDP forecast on TME across all years. As is clear, for a
given growth forecast horizon, spending plans for the upcoming fiscal year (t = h + 1)
are most reactive to revisions to growth forecasts.
To further verify the conclusions we draw, we shorten the sample to only include
observations prior to the Cameron Government and repeat the analysis from Table
1. Table 2 reports the results from the first exercise, separating the Cameron and
May Governments from the rest of the sample. Since 2010, spending plans have
been less counter-cyclical than previously, or equivalently, the Major, Blair and Brown
governments reacted more to news of the economy in terms of adjusting the path of
TME.
It is tempting to conclude that these revisions were part of a sensible response
to ‘news’ about the economy, in so far as they seem to represent the operation of
automatic stabilisers. However, until we assess the contributions from AME and DEL,
we will not be sure that learning about the state of the economy finds an automatic
response in fiscal expenditure, nor will we know if it is anywhere near to optimal given
the shock and the structure of the economy. We will not know how to set rules for
expenditure and control that allow for such responses within the overall fiscal framework
as planned by HMT and assessed by the OBR. These are very significant issues, as all the
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interviewees emphasised that fiscal rules matter but that they have a limited duration.
The importance of formal fiscal rules consists in imposing two kinds of discipline: (1)
external discipline, through independently assessed forecasts in the period 1997-2010 or
through the independent Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) since 2010. However,
neither arrangement necessarily eliminates forecast bias, which is to do with economic
modelling that has changed little since independent assessments or the creation of
the OBR; (2) internal discipline, by defining a framework that balances departmental
demands with overall spending, as well as the composition of expenditure (current and
capital, but this distinction is arguably more blurred than is commonly assumed). The
new fiscal framework that was adopted after 1997 marked a fundamental change insofar
as it shifted expenditure planning and controlling from a one-year horizon with annual
negotiations between HMT and spending departments to a three-year horizon, including
the possibility of carrying over non-spend. But while the Spending Reviews allowed
for some more long-term economic planning, the Budget and the Autumn Statement
continued to generate an element of political uncertainty. One of the main reasons why
fiscal rules and their usefulness are limited in time is the trade-off between credibility
and flexibility. At some point in the economic and the political cycle, sticking to a set
of rules will be at odds with having room for manoeuvre. There are two prominent
examples during the period in question: (1) the lower-than-expected tax revenues in
2000-01 from non-financial corporations, which led to a structural deficit in the 2004
Spending Review (see, Johnson, 2016) and an extension of the economic cycle from
seven years to twelve years (cf. HMT, 2008); (2) lower-than-expected growth in 2011-
12, which shifted the timetable in relation to deficit reduction. Fiscal rules also tend to
reduce uncertainty in the sense of unpredictable behaviour by government, but they can
introduce new types of complexity that exacerbate an already uncertain horizon. For
example, new rules can lead to even greater departmental under-spend than previous
fiscal frameworks, as the sanctions for over-spend are becoming more severe. Reasons
for under-spending allocated budgets include the fear of being hauled in front of the
Public Accounts Committee, the lack of good procurement and the tendency of front-
line departments (especially local government and the NHS) to be better at spending
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money than Whitehall departments. Moreover, HMT has relatively poor oversight in
terms of departmental budget accounting, and the end-of-year spending facility has
been contested. If departments end up ‘gaming the system’, then that would lead
to greater unpredictability. What ‘rules of thumb’ did HMT use in order to manage
uncertainty? ‘Rules of thumb’ ranged from formal fiscal rules via estimates of Annual
Managed Expenditure and forecasts for GDP and tax revenue to pension expenditure,
public sector pay and other big ‘fixed costs’ (e.g. monthly meetings of pay boards in the
period 1997-2010). Arguably, this process can be described as the ‘rule of big numbers’,
which is the result of an asymmetry of information in favour of spending departments.
4 Warranted Expenditure
Having examined the drivers of innovations in government expenditure, we can also
try to model the overall level of expenditure. We can interpret deviations from the
‘warranted’ level of expenditure as a deliberate discretionary choice. We can then
go further and decompose expenditure by function and being to understand which
departments were supported and which were not over time in the overall allocation
of spending. We will, for example, add up all spending on education whether it comes
from the education department or other departments, including the devolved authorities.
And this analysis would allow us to determine whether governments routinely target
particular departments when implementing spending reductions, or when conducting
fiscal expansions. This would perhaps shed light on whether the spending paths for
any departments should be treated with particular caution (in that the confidence
intervals around these departments spending plans would be wider). The largest share
of government expenditure (around 40 per cent) is spent on social protection, which
includes pensions and other welfare spending, followed by health care spending (around
20 per cent) and education (10-15 per cent). According to this classification, the type of
public service that saw the largest absolute decline in annual funding between 2010-11
and 2016-17 of £260 per head was education, a reduction of 16 per cent. In percentage
terms, spending on economic development was reduced most (60 per cent or £130 per
head in real terms), followed by employment policies (48 per cent or £36 per head) and
housing (45 per cent or £131 per head). Per capita spending on health care and social
protection remained relatively unchanged. Annual health care expenditure in real terms
was increased from around £2,100 per head in 2010-11 to £2,200 per head in 2016-
17, while annual social protection spending was around £4,000 per head in 2016-17,
virtually the same as six years before. But even some of the protected areas may not
have received enough resources to maintain the quality of service expected. For example,
at a time when the elderly population is increasing, it is often claimed that not enough
resources have been allocated to health, even though its budget has not been cut. The
demand for other services too is likely to be affected by population aging and other
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demands. This raises an important consideration for our analysis, namely, do whether
governments (inherently political in their nature) respond not just to news about the
underlying economy, but also pressure from the electorate. One method to implement
this notion is set out in Hantzsche and Young (2018) and in Pain, Weale and Young
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This is estimated in a regression of the following form:
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The approach allows for the construction of an estimate of the amount of public
spending that would have been chosen by previous governments if confronted by the
circumstances of today. We call this warranted spending as it reflects the historic
choices made by democratically elected governments. Hantzsche and Young find that
the consolidation in public spending between 2010-11 and 2014-15 was actually a little
slower than what was warranted (red line in Figure 9).
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The weak fiscal position at the start of the period required a reduction of TME
to close to 40 per cent of GDP over a five-year period. This is broadly the pace of
consolidation that the coalition government wanted to achieve when it set out its 2010
spending plans. However, our analysis shows that after 2014-15, actual spending became
more stringent than would have been warranted by previous governments spending
priorities. In particular rising demographic pressures in combination with a more
favourable business cycle meant that our benchmark path for TME rises back up to
44 per cent of GDP, compared to actual spending which dropped below 40 per cent in
2016-17. We can use this analysis to calculate the implications for real spending per head
of population. In the financial year 2010-11, the government spent £12,494 per head in
real terms. Six years later, the average expenditure on public services had dropped by
6% to £11,738. Figure 10 shows for each of those six years, by how much real spending
per capita deviated from our benchmark.
During the early years of the consolidation, our analysis suggests that there would
have been room to reduce annual spending per head by another £300 to £400, or 3 per
cent. After 2014-15, however, the consolidation appears to have been extended beyond
the levels implied by our benchmark relationship as annual spending per head was cut
by up to £1,400, or 12 per cent, compared to what previous governments would have
undertaken. If this “underspend” were to continue, it may pressure the Government to
diverge from their spending plans, regardless of any news about the forecasted prospects
for the economy.
The same approach can be implemented by function. Figure 10 shows the over-
and underfunding of spending areas, accumulated over the seven years of the fiscal
consolidation 2010-11 to 2016-17, as suggested by our benchmark. Spending on
education has fallen short by around £3,000 per head, compared to our benchmark.
This is despite the fact that schools funding had been protected by the government.
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Real education spending per head of population fell by 13% over the period, partly
reflecting the shift away from government funding of universities.
We break down our estimates of over- and underfunding by year, shows that even in
areas in which spending in the early years of the fiscal squeeze has been very much in line
with our benchmark, such as health care and social protection, consolidation has been
going on for too long now. For instance, our analysis implies that in 2016-17 the health
care sector lacked around £440 per head in funding. Any room to save on spending for
social protection appeared to be fully exhausted by 2017.
The estimates of warranted spending suggest that the spending restraint introduced
by the coalition government was broadly warranted by past experience, but was no
longer the case beyond 2015. This approach then suggests that by the end of the period
further spending restraint was no longer compatible with the historic choices of the
British electorate, and may provide an incentive for the Government to deviate from
published spending plans, over and above the underlying state of the economy. Other
issues that emerge from our analysis and the interviews include the shift after 1997
from assessing the outcome of public expenditure to measuring the efficiency, output
and value-for-money, and this has changed the ways in which public spending is planned
and controlled. Since then HMT dedicates more time to measuring the extent to which
spending departments achieve the centrally defined targets. During the ten years of
economic expansion, the need to boost productivity was far less urgent, but following
the financial crash, the tendency of productivity to flat-line costs the public sector in the
region of £30bn per year. Fiscal consolidation would look very different with stronger
productivity growth.
5 Further work and concluding remarks
The analysis in this paper has focussed solely on the expenditure side of fiscal
planning undertaken by the Treasury. Our intentions for future work are to extend
this analysis in a number of directions, incorporating suggestions from participants
at our policy workshop held at NIESR. In particular, and as discussed earlier, the
potential heterogeneity across types of spending in response to news is of particular
interest. While our spending series is an aggregate measure, it is important to recall
the spending structure introduced in 1997 that splits spending into DEL and AME.
Repeating the analysis for disaggregated spending will shed light on whether our finding
of a countercyclical response of spending reflects heterogeneous responses of DEL and
AME. The same distinction can be made in terms of Government consumption and
capital spending, allowing us to examine whether politicians and Treasury officials
routinely prioritise one area of spending when they receive new information about the
economy. This work will involve extending the cross-sectional dimension of our sample
by disaggregating the headline series into the sub-components discussed here. It will also
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involve: a more detailed analysis of the composition of UK public spending, in particular
how strict or fluid the boundaries are between current and capital expenditure; the tax
side has to be fully integrated into a comprehensive analysis of how expenditure planning
and control deals with uncertainty; the ways in which uncertainty is managed also require
another key dimension, notably taking into account the symmetry of monetary policy
targets in relation to the asymmetry of fiscal policy; monetary policy has a symmetric
target: it is not desirable either to over- or to under-achieve the inflation target or to
jeopardise financial stability; by contrast, fiscal policy has to be asymmetric because
of prudence about projected GDP growth figures and because it is easier to manage
better-than-expected growth and tax revenues than worse ones; more lessons are yet to
be learned from the various fiscal framework in the period of 1993-2015 (HMT, 1997 and
1998); more lessons are yet to be learned from the various fiscal framework in the period
of 1993-2015 (HMT, 1997 and 1998); there is also much work to be done on revising
economic modelling in order to reflect a national and a world economy characterised by
high volatility and low predictability.
Several workshop participants emphasised that to understand fully the pass-through
mechanism from revisions to growth forecasts to changes to spending plans, it is
important to consider both the reaction of tax receipt forecasts to changes in growth
forecasts, as well as how the level of fiscal space available to the Government affects
both reductions to spending (if, for example, debt/GDP is high by historical standards)
and increases in spending (if the Government has a high degree of ‘fiscal space’). In a
sense, these questions are linked, in that they involve understanding how revisions to
the state of the economy, spending and taxation affect each other contemporaneously.
Offering a definitive answer will involve extending our available dataset both in terms
of the number of periods available, as well as creating a similar revision series for tax
receipts and solving the endogeneity problem that is immediately apparent. As such,
this work is deliberately left as work for a larger scale project.
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Annex ʹ Anonymised Interviews 
 
I. former politician at HMT 
 
1. the post-1997 fiscal framework had 3 objectives 
 
(i) political credibility ʹ reassurance of prudent stewardship of pubic finances 
(ii) stability and longer-term perspective 
(iii) boosting investment in health and education 
å room for manoeuvre determined largely by social security 
 
2. fiscal rules had the effect of 
- imposing external discipline: independently assessed forecasts 
- imposing internal discipline: departmental expenditure and demands 
 
3. RAB was set up with the best of intentions but did not really work to produce better stewardship, 
e.g. true costs of government in relation to the student loan system 
 
4. current versus capital spending: largely presentational, and caught in the tensions between 
discipline and flexibility 
 
5. forecasts: it is not just the government that is optimistic, so are the OBR (essentially the same 
people and the same models) 
 
6. fiscal consolidation after 2010: the LibDems provided political cover for Tory austerity 
 
7. halving or eliminating the deficit was the main fault-line between Lab and Tory approach 
 
8. cutting capital and local government spending did affect economic growth but very hard, if not 
impossible, to quantify 
 
9. areas of government expenditure less affecting growth include defence spending, but politically 
untenable to impose even larger cuts 
 
10. in terms of fiscal rules, longer-term horizons are better than shorter ones BUT 
a. uncertainty arises from unanticipated events 
b. there is fluidity between capital spending, current spending and revenue from tax 
c. room for manoeuvre is key 
 
 
II. former politician at HMT 
 
1. key issues 
(a) how did Labour end up with a structural deficit in 2004 Spending Review? 
(b) double dip recession 
(c) lessons from fiscal consolidation 
(d) how to conduct fiscal consolidation without harming equality? 
å governments need 
[i] a story 
[ii] an industrial strategy 
[iii] radical decentralisation  
 





[a] yes but there was also growing complexity: 
(i) departmental under-spend 
(ii) poor oversight by HMT in terms of departmental budgetary accounting 
(iii) end of year funding was contested 
 
å departments end up gaming the system, which leads to greater unpredictability 
 
 ?ď ?,Dd ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞǁĂƐĨŽĐƵƐĞĚŽŶ 
(i) growth balance 
(ii) tax revenue (and GDP) are volatile å spending envelope 
 
3. growth forecasts (whether by HMT and then checked by ONS or later by OBR) tend to be over-
optimistic; as are tax revenue forecasts 
 
=> structural deficit in 2004 because of big spending hike (2000-01 onwards) but tax revenue poorer  
 
4. departmental under-spend: 
(i) personal fear (being hauled in front od Public Accounts Committee) 
(ii) poor at procurement 




5. AME forecasts 
 
=> ƚŚĞĐƵůƚƵƌĞŽĨ,DdŚĂƐĂĚĂƉƚĞĚƚŽ ‘ǁĞůů-ŬŶŽǁŶ ?ƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇ ?ZƵŵƐĨĞůĚ ?ƐŬŶŽǁŶƵŶŬŶŽǁŶƐ ? but it 
is not good at stable medium-term fiscal management 
 
 ? ?ǁŚĂƚ ‘ƌƵůĞƐŽĨƚŚƵŵď ? ? 
 






- forecasts for tax revenue 
 
- pension expenditure fairly stable 
 
- models within big spending departments are poor, e.g. DWP on disability or Defence 
 
схƉƵďůŝĐƐĞĐƚŽƌƉĂǇĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌďŝŐ ‘ĨŝǆĞĚĐŽƐƚƐ ? ?ƚŚĂƚ ?ƐǁŚǇ EĞǁ>ĂďŽƵƌĐƌĞĂƚĞĚŵŽŶƚŚůǇŵĞĞƚŝŶŐƐŽĨ
pay board) 
 
=> ƌƵůĞŽĨ ‘ďŝŐŶƵŵďĞƌƐ ?ĂƐĂƌĞƐƵůƚŽĨĂƐǇŵŵĞƚƌǇŽĨŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŝn favour of spending departments 
 
7. there were 3 things New Labour should have done but did not do 
 
(i) maximising transparency by creating the OBR in a context of 
 




- low predictability 
 
å OBR would have been in line with the spirit of the 1997 fiscal rules in an open economy 
 
(ii) 2/3 spending and 1/3 tax component of fiscal consolidation mix 
å one question is how quickly tax revenues would have rebounded 
å VAT increase instead of NICS (NOT advocated by other) 
 
(iii) tone and presentation 
- not enough reassurance of the markets 
- split at the heart of government between PM and Chancellor 
 
8. fiscal consolidation after 2010 General Election 
 
- 90% spending cuts, 10% tax 
 
- but investment declined and so did economic growth 
 
- compounded by regional differences, a lack of investment contributed to the slowest recovery in 70 
years or so 
 
8. There was and is a fetish of big projects (roads, HS2 or now Heathrow) whereas a boost in house 
building is what was most needed, for example by raising the borrowing cap of certain councils 
across the country 
 
9. reduce revenue spending and increase capital spending BUT NHS, schools and defence absorb vast 
resources, while BIS and local government spending were slashed 
 
10. there were 2 errors: 
 
(i) over-optimistic growth forecasts 
(ii) over-optimistic expectations about tax revenue 
 
III. former official at economic agency 
 
1. in the period 1990-95, GDP estimates were higher than real GDP, but so were actual tax revenues 
(compared with projected ones) 
å spending was higher than initially anticipated, but still tight 
å over-optimism 
 
2. fiscal policy should be asymmetric, deliberately cautious about projected GDP growth figures 
(audited by ONS until creation of OBR) because it is easier to manage better than expected growth 
and tax revenues than worse ones 
 
3. monetary policy, by contrast, has a symmetric target: neither over- nor under-achievement of 
inflation target is desirable 
 
4. built-in margins of errors 
(i) cutting capital expenditure rather than current spending 





 ? ?ŶĞǁƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐƉůĞĚŐĞƐĐĂŶĚƌĂŝŶďĂĐŬƉŽĐŬĞƚƐ ?Ğ ?Ő ?EĞǁ>ĂďŽƵƌ ?ƐE,^ĞǆƉĞŶĚŝƚƵƌĞƉůĞĚŐĞƐŝŶ
2001-2 
 
 ? ? ?ƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞĨŽƌĂƉƵƌƉŽƐĞ ? ?,DdŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐǀĞƌƐƵƐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƉƌŝŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ ? 
 
7. composition of spending has changed 
 
8. about RAB: it should have made a difference but came on stream too late (2010/11); capital 
charging (to spending departments) 
 
9. PBR 
- in principle 3-year horizon existed prior to 1997 
- in practice, negotiations were on a year-by-year basis 
å HMT did little else than negotiate with departments 
å spending review freed up time for other things and for some more long-term planning 
 
10. on capital spending, the overall composition of expenditure changed 
(i) generally, government investment as a proportion of GDP: 3-4% 
(ii) by 1997, this has declined to 0.6% and then rose to about 1.5% 
(iii) 30-40% of public debt as a proportion of GDP was seen as acceptable 
 
11. frontline spending 
(i) public sector productivity was very flat 
(ii) in the good years, less concern for productivity and value-for-money 
 
12. fiscal consolidation after 2010 
(i) in a context of flat-lining productivity but also historically low interest rates 
(ii) local government spending slashed 
(iii) some investment going up, e.g. Cross Rail and HS2 
å coalition government was frustrated by lack of capital investment in the private sector and long 
delays in getting public investment going 
 
13. on tax 
(i) tax revenue from VAT went down in the 1990s (against expectations) 
(ii) HMRC has data but does not necessarily share it 
 
IV. former official in HMT 
 
1. over-optimism?  
 
(i) not quite: there are built-in protections but politicians may not always take notice 
 
(ii) OBR has marked a shift in forecasts and projections 
 
(iii) Gold Rule and other fiscal rules 
å flexibility in relation to rules because uncertainty is a fact of life 
 
2. greater continuity or discontinuity when there is a change in government? 
 
(i) balance budgets over the economic cycle 
(ii) long-term ƐƵƐƚĂŝŶĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨƉƵďůŝĐĨŝŶĂŶĐĞƐ ?ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ďĂůĂŶĐĞƐŚĞĞƚ ? ? 




(iv) IMF views do not fundamentally change the analysis or action, but they act as important opinion-
formers 
 
3. unclear how different fiscal rules really are; HMT officials tend to give the same advice 
 
4. 2-3 year horizon and 5-year spending reviews 
 
(i) the latter made a big difference when it came to large new programmes, e.g. BIS catapult project 
or investment in transport, but depends on department 
 
(ii) relative stability for 2-3 years, but greater uncertainty at the time of Autumn/Spring Statement 
and Budget Day, as well as change in government 
 
(iii) there is some inertia in the system, because the largest blocks of spending (health, DWP and 
education) tend not to change fundamental because of political priorities/pressures 
 
(iv) however, a change in government can lead to important shifts, e.g. tuition fees or HS2 
 
5. changes in 2010 
 
(i) structural: tighten the belts 
(ii) political priorities and strategy: ideology vs. evidence 
 ?ŝŝŝ ? ?ďǇĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞĨƵƚƵƌĞ ? ?/ŶƚŚŝƐƐĞŶƐĞ ?ƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ ?ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ-based 
poliĐǇƌŝƐŬƐďĞŝŶŐĂŶŽǆǇŵŽƌŽŶ ? 
 
V. former special adviser 
 
1. there are two levels of ƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇ ?ŵĂŶĂŐĞĂďůĞƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇ ? ?ƐƚƵĨĨŚĂƉƉĞŶƐ ? ?ĂŶĚĚƌĂŵĂƚŝĐ
uncertainty (near collapse of LTCM in 1998, dot.com bubble, 2008 financial crisis, Eurozone) 
 
2. New Labour voluntarily downgraded the trend growth rate from 2.5 to 2.25% 
 
3. The overall approach was based on a cautious case and with the intention of controlling the timing 
of the economic cycle 
 
4. OBR-type arrangement was not on the agenda 
 
5. the most difficult thing politically speaking is to cope with late, random and unexpected revisions, 
just before budget day 
 
6. one way to try to reduce uncertainty is to manage expectations 
 
7. big change after 1997 was to move towards performance management: delivery and outcomes, 
not just outputs 
 
8. 2002 is when things got tougher 
(i) better than expected in 1998 and 2000 
(ii) 2000 was capital heavy 
(iii) 2001-02: fiscal revenue from non-financial corporations was lower than predicted 





9. among the ĞǀĞŶƚƐƚŚĂƚĞǆĂĐĞƌďĂƚĞĚƚŚĞh< ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĂĨƚĞƌ ? ? ? ?ǁĂƐƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?h^ďƵĚŐĞƚƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ
and the second wave of the Eurozone crisis 
 
VI. former official in HMT 
 
1. the interviewee has experience on both the spending and tax side; she worked in HMT and in 
spending departments 
 
2. Under Ken Clarke, there was a principle of a 3-year horizon but in reality 1 year instead, with 
yearly negotiations between HMT and spending departments 
 
3. (lack of) central control vs (absence of) bottom-up flexibility 
å this led to a shift towards 3-year spending envelopes 
 
4. if growth went down or social security spending (and other automatic stabilisers), then what? 
(i) there was flexibility in relation to capital spending, which can be a problem for economic growth 
ďƵƚ ?ŐŽŽĚ ?ĨŽƌƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ 
å this changed after 1997 and remained largely intact until 2010 
(ii) the model was one of top-down target and defining total expenditure 
 
5. in terms of forecasts of the state of the economy, these were done first by HMT and later by the 
OBR 
å ƚŚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶǁĂƐĂůǁĂǇƐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌ ?ƐũƵĚŐĞŵĞŶƚĂŶĚƚŚĞĐƌĞĚŝďŝůŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞŶƵŵďĞƌƐ 
å process response to shocks: Chancellor Brown excised his judgement, but not Chancellors 
Osborne or Hammond 
å ONS and OBR do not do the same thing 
 
6. fiscal rules matter but they do not have a very long duration; once again there are questions about 
the credibility of fiscal rules 
(i) after 2010, fiscal rules and OBR were key to the planning and controlling of UK public expenditure 
(ii) some inevitable gaming of the system 
(iii) big decisions on tax and spend 
 
7. When growth turned out to be more sluggish, George Osborne tried to put more money into 
investment, but there was a fiscal straight jacket: financial and economic probity compared with New 
Labour 
 
8. it is not true that the shift to longer-term spending envelopes has led to more strategic, long-term 
planning of UK public expenditure; under Chancellor Hammond, for example, there are two fiscal 
events per year even though it is supposed to be a single unified budget 
 
9. the OBR evaluation of forecasts matters 
 
 
 
 
 
